THE NPC IN CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL

GOVERNMENT

 

 

One of the most obvious marks of democratic progress made in China by the grand reforms becomes evident by chatting with any Chinese citizen of average education. When asked about the NPC, he or she is certain to say, “The NPC? Oh, it is the state organ of highest power.” This reveals that the NPC has made a strong impression upon the minds of ordinary Chinese. However, to have a full conception of the NPC’s powers, it is necessary to put the NPC into its constitutional perspective. The description of that setting begins with the leadership of the Communist Party over the state, and then with the associated statuses of the state president, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Each of these institutions has relationships to the NPC.

 

This chapter begins by describing how the Party leads all the central state branches. Then it outlines all the other central state branches that have been created by the NPC. After that it examines the powers of the NPC. Because the NPC actually exists in two forms, the NPC Full Congress and the NPC Standing Committee, I look first at the powers of the NPC Full Congress and then at those of the NPC Standing Committee. I will conclude with some evaluations.

 

A. Communist Party Leadership over the State

 

Previously I described why the leadership of the Communist Party over all China’s state branches and mass organizations is maintained as the cardinal principle for both the Party and the nation. How is the Party’s leadership over the state fulfilled? Actually the means that the Party uses have undergone some changes and improvements since 1987. First I will describe how the Party led the state before 1987,and then point out subsequent improvements that have since emerged.

 

1. Party in the Place of Government Prior to 1987

 

In the years before 1987 the Communist Party assumed authority over all governmental decisions. The executive and other state branches were simply the institutions that administered decisions made by the Party. All state branches were responsible to the Party.

 

To be sure, a very complete state structure was established by the 1954 Constitution. It provided for the State President and the legislative, executive, military, trial and procuratorial organs. In fact, however, the Communist Party provided leadership to all of them. The Constitution failed to “regulate what channels and ways should be followed by the Communist Party as the party in power to guide state power and state life. Consequently, the leadership of the Communist Party gradually detached the state structure; the Communist organization reinforced its leadership outside state institutions.”

 

In 1958 the Party formally confirmed the extent of its control over the government. The Central Committee of the Party issued an official paper stipulating that the Party’s Political Bureau would determine the grand program and guidelines for the state. The Party Secretariat would devise all specific arrangements. Both the grand program and the guidelines for it along with specific arrangements would be centralized and no distinction would be made between the Party and the government. Policy implementation would be the responsibility of both governmental departments and the Party cores. Following this stipulation, the Party undertook two tasks, one to manage its own affairs and the other to directly exercise all state powers. The Party set up various departments within its own organization to correspond with those of the executive, the trial and the procuratorial. The Party departments formulated policies to implement the Political Bureau’s grand programs and guidelines. Then the Party departments issued orders to corresponding departments of the executive branch, the court and the procuratorate to carry out these policies. An additional measure to ensure that all state organs did implement instructions from the Party was the appointment by the Central Committee of Communist Party Communist Core to every central state organ. In each central state organ the Party organization Core was responsible to the Party’s Central Committee to exert oversight on the state organ and make sure that the instructions from the Central Committee of the Party were implemented. Thus the national executive, trial and procuratorial branches were subordinate and responsible to the Central Committee of the Party, or specifically to its various administrative and judicial departments.

 

This Party-in-the-stead-of-government Practice broughts erious constitutional consequences. Chinese political scholars Shi Jiuqing and Ni Jiatai made piercing criticisms of these consequences.

 

According to Shi Jiuqing and Ni Jiatai, the Communist Party overreached in its exercise of leadership over the people’s congresses. It did so by turning the Party headquarters itself into a power center. The primary center of power was the headquarters of the Communist Party at various levels. The NPC and LPCs were only secondary power centers. The power of the Party was dominant. In their secondary status the NPC and LPCs had become “rubber stamps which simply give passive approval to the Party lines, orientation, policies and major decisions.It is liable for the Party to evade supervision and makes it difficult to prevent abuses of Party power.”

 

During the era of the Party-in-the-stead-of-government Practice the NPC had almost no role to play. The Communist Party made decisions with Party papers. The Party legitimized its decisions with its own authority alone. The Communist Party simply required the executive and the judicial arms to administer its decisions.

 

Such a Party-in-the-stead-of-government Practice gradually proved to be disadvantageous not only for the state, but for the Party as well. Some thirty years later, the Party formally denounced this practice. On behalf of the 12th Central Committee, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang reported to the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party in 1987 that the regime “actually reduces the Party’s status of leadership and weakens its function to lead.” The practice “moves the Party to the forefront of administration, easily resulting in the Party being caught in contradictions, or even causing contradictions.” Further, it “turns the Party into the direct administrator.” Thus it lost the ability to exercise oversight of the bureaucracy.

 

The state branches suffered most under the practice. As Chinese political scholar Xie Qingkui and his co-authors criticized, the regime over-centralized powers in the Party and “impeded the realization of a relatively independent state power organ system with real powers. The basically rational structure of form and function for allocating state power was rendered nominal and could hardly carry out its functions or play its roles.” The NPC was the number one loser. Its powers to elect and appoint, to legislate, to decide and oversee became redundant. As all other state organs created by it were responsible directly to the Party, the NPC could not exert control over them.

 

2. Dividing Functions between the Party and the Government

after 1987

 

The year 1987 marks the beginning of a turnaround within the Party itself from the Party-in-the-stead-of-government practice. At the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party, the Party formally accepted suggestions to introduce substantial reforms regarding the relationship between the Party and the state organs. A major theme of the reform was to divide functions between the Party and the state organs.

 

The Party recognized that it and the state organs differ from each other in nature, function, organizational form and manner of work. The idea that clear distinctions should be drawn between the functions of the two sides was accepted. Relations between the Party on the one hand and the people’s congress, the executive and the judiciary on the other had to be corrected so that each of them could play its proper role.

 

The reason for establishing the Party-in-the-stead-of-government practice was unresolved issues about the proper role of the Party. The 13th National Congress of the Party made a fundamental shift in the Party-state relationship by redefining the function of the Party. It said that, “The nature of the Party’s leadership is political in nature. It is to guide with political principles, political direction, major decisions and recommendations regarding leading officials for the state power organs. The Party exercises its leadership first by transforming the Party’s proposals through the legal processes into the state will. It educates the mass public to understand the Party’s guiding principles and its policies through both the Party organizations’ activities and its model members’ work.” The Party Central Committee exercised its political leadership in two ways. It formulates decisions on major questions in domestic, foreign, economic, defense and other fields and it recommends candidates for leading posts in the central organs of state power.

 

In 1987-88 changes quickly began to differentiate reforms in both the Party and the state. After 1989, however,the Party slowed the dance of reform to a safe and slow waltz.

 

Today China’s reformed Party-state relationship manifests itself in several ways. First of all, the Communist Party firmly maintains its status as the Party in power. (Chinese political scholar Zhu Guanglei terms the Communist Party of China as “the Party in power with the leadership position.” According to Chinese understanding, the Communist Party as the Party in power means that all state and mass organizations, civil or armed, are controlled by the Party. That control extends to public officials, public media, the armed forces and the like. The Party organizations function like a net over all the land to make sure that every part of the country unites under the Party. Secondly, the Party guides the state with political principles. The “four cardinal principles” and the reform and open-up strategy are basic political principles advanced by the Party for the state. Thirdly, the Party guides the state in its political direction. What does this guidance of political direction amount to? Chinese political scholars like Pu Xingzu define it as follows: “In accordance with certain political principles, guidance of political direction means to point out the objectives to be realized in a certain historical period.” The 13th National Congress of the Communist Party decided a basic line for itself. It is to lead and unite people of all ethnic groups in China to focus on economic construction, to adhere to the “four cardinal principles” and to pursue reform and the opening up of the country. China will rely on its efforts and work hard and perseveringly to build the country of China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized and modernized socialist power. This basic line from the Party sets forth the target for the state. In other words, it “embodies the Party’s guidance for the political direction” of the state. Fourthly, the Party leads the state’s major decision-making. In order to realize the targets of all work, the Party formulates grand policies in all fields and introduces them to the state. For example, the Party gave up the watchword, “Taking class struggle as the head rope” and transferred the work focus to socialist modernization, reforms of the economic and political systems and development of the socialist market economy. Fifthly, the Party recommends candidates for leading state offices. Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji were recommended by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the NPC to be state president, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and premier respectively. Sixthly, the Party approves major policy proposals for each of the central state organs. The NPC submits its Five-Year Legislative Program to the Central Committee of the Party for approval. Likewise it approved major pieces of the NPC’s legislative proposals, like the widely demanded draft Oversight Act. The State Council also seeks approval for its grand policy proposals from the Central Committee.

 

3. Leadership over or within the NPC

 

Professor Zhu Guanglei introduced a Western perspective on the governmental process into study of China’s politics. For him, “The core concept of the Chinese governmental process, as well as the major relationship and problem, is the ‘Party-government relationship.’ ” While the number of Chinese political scholars who have adopted the governmental process concept is small, certainly all of them share his point of view. To consider the Party-government relationship I first examine the relationship between the Party and the NPC. The state or governmental powers assumed by the Communist Party in the old days largely belonged to the NPC. Now that the Communist Party has resolved to separate the functions of the Party and the government, one question to resolve is, how shall the Communist Party exercise its leadership in the NPC?

 

The general understanding in China is that the Party exercises its leadership through the NPC. This perspective assumes that the Party functions over the NPC. In contrast Professors Shi Jiuqing and Ni Jiatai advocate a “within NPC” approach that is unique among political writings by Chinese scholars. The within-NPC approach has two parts. First, policies of the Communist Party must be submitted to the NPC and cannot be implemented until they are passed or enacted by the NPC. Actually this part does not conflict with the through-NPC approach. The second part opposes Party control over the NPC in exercising its leadership. It asserts that “The right operational mechanism for the Party in power to realize its leadership should be that which is realized within people’s congresses.” Organizationally they advocate that “The Party-in-power should put forth its policies and proposals through its congressional caucus subject to scrutiny and voting by representatives of all the parties or organizations in Congress. They may decide to adopt the policies and proposals, or to have them amended, re-voted on, or even to reject them.”

 

While I certainly understand what Shi and Ni mean, I doubt their wisdom. In my opinion, the separation between the function of the Party and that of the state should be realized by maintaining the over-NPC position of the Communist Party. Indeed, it is the over-NPC status of the Communist Party that distinguishes it from all other political parties of China and of the West. That is the very basis on which I term it the Party in leadership. The Party in leadership should formulate the grand platform and major policies, submitting them to the NPC and recommending candidates for leading state offices to the NPC. All these actions should be done in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of The Communist Party exercises this political prerogative because it is the Party in leadership and its leadership does not depend upon the number of its seats in the NPC.

 

Can the over-NPC leadership from the Communist Party be harmonized with the NPC actively exercising its constitutional powers? (By “actively” I mean the NPC being free to amend, pass or reject Communist policies or proposals, as Shi and Ni recommend in their book.) I think it can. Democracy and the rule of law require that the Communist Party submits its policies and proposals to the NPC and that the state and the public follow only those policies and proposals of the Communist Party that have been adopted by the NPC. Certainly the NPC process will be meaningless if the NPC cannot amend or reject the Parties policies or proposals that its Deputies consider undesirable or even unacceptable. To be sure the Communist Party submits its policies or proposals to the NPC because it thinks that they represent the will or interest of the people. The NPC provides a check on the Communist Party policies or proposals. Do they really correspond to the will of the people or not? No one can assure that every policy or proposal of the Communist Party corresponds exactly to the will or interest of the people. In practice some major policies of the Communist Party did misjudge the will or interest of the people. As the highest organ authorized for representation of the people, the NPC does have particular superiority for finding out what the people want and what is in their best interests. The Communist Party properly proposes what is to the interest of the people, but the NPC should decide the question. Ultimately the Communist Party and the NPC harmonize with one another in the common pursuit of the people’s interests.

 

The separation reform is certainly good news for the NPC. As the Party observes the legal procedure for turning its program into legislation, the NPC obtains official recognition. Now it can operate on a regular basis. The State Council, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate now account to NPC on fixed intervals for their policies and performances. The NPC’s institutional development receives a green light for gradual change. Nevertheless, the people should keep in mind that the NPC remains under the leadership of the Party. Most Party leaders have exercised remarkable care in introducing reform measures to deal with the Party-state relationship, but some leaders of the Party may find it difficult to resist the old modes for exercising the leadership. This is especially the case whenever circumstances become tense. The NPC has to walk carefully so that it can progress step by step in a relaxed and secure situation.

 

B. The State President

 

Among Chinese conflicting political understandings about the institution of the state presidency of China are quite perplexing both to them and to foreign observers. However, an increasingly pragmatic approach to the office will relieve that problem.

 

1. The Evolving Institution

 

Since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the position of head of state underwent many radical changes. The significance of the institution of state president ebbed and flowed with the changes.

 

Collective State Headship

 

During the 1949-54 period, there was no single state president. Instead, the Central People’s Government (CPG) served as the state head collectively. The CPG held double responsibilities. On the one hand, it exercised the legislative power and hence was virtually the national legislature. On the other hand, however, it exercised those powers that should be exercised by the state head. That is why Chinese political scholars hold that the CPG was the collective head of state during that period.

 

Single State President

 

From 1954 to 1975,a single state presidency was established as the state head under the 1954 Constitution. In accordance with decisions made by the NPC, the state president called “chairman” at that time exercised all powers internationally recognized to rest with a state head. Mao Zedong was the first state president. Liu Shaoqi succeeded Mao and served the nation as a most popular state president until he was illegally persecuted during the “cultural revolution.”

 

No State Head

 

The 1975 and 1978 Constitutions abolished the institution of state president altogether and from 1975 to 1982 the state acted without a proper head of state. During this period there were people, like Lin Biao, who argued for a single state president in the new Constitution. However, Mao Zedong was resolutely opposed to reestablishing the institution of state president. Fears within the Party leadership were that such an office could be used to take powers away from the Communist Party or its top leader. Abolition of the office of state president, together with other constitutional measures to weaken the state institutions, reinforced the need to have centralized powers in the leadership of the Party. The best example was when the power to nominate the premier was wrested from the state president, as provided by the 1954 Constitution, and given to the Communist Central Committee. With that change the state president lost his power to command the armed forces as chairman of the Defense Committee. Those powers went to the chairman of the Party Central Committee. Protocol powers enjoyed by the state president under the 1954 Constitution were reallocated to the NPC Standing Committee. The powers of the state president under the 1954 Constitution to promulgate laws and to declare emergencies were all abolished.

 

Reestablishing the State Presidency

 

Those favoring a separate institution of state president finally won out in the 1982 Constitution. The Communist Party top leadership now accepts that a single and separate state president is absolutely necessary for a division of functions between the Party and state. The office is indispensable for realizing a rationalized division of responsibilities among the central state institutions. The 1982 Constitution reestablished the state presidency as a separate central state institution, second only to NPC.

 

2. Election and Term

 

The office of state president of China is filled by indirect election. Once elected, the state president enjoys a large number of powers but almost all of them have to be exercised in accordance with the will of the NPC or the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

 

The NPC elects the state president and the state vice president separately. The Central Committee of the Communist Party recommends to the Presidium of the NPC in session one candidate for state president and another for state vice president. The Presidium then formally nominates the candidates to the NPC Full Congress. An absolute majority of the Full Congress is necessary for electing each one.

 

The state president and the state vice president serve a term of five years, largely corresponding with that of the NPC Full Congress that elects them. However, both state president and state vice president exercise their functions and powers until the succeeding NPC Full Congress assumes office and elects the new president and vice president. No person can hold the state presidency or state vice presidency for more than two consecutive terms.

 

According to the Constitution, any Chinese aged 45 or over can run for either state president or state vice president. In the reality, however, the qualities required of candidates for both offices are rich political experiences, high reputation and prestige. Political party affiliation does not matter, not absolutely. For example, a non-Communist can be recommended for state vice president.

 

The state vice president succeeds to the office of state president when the latter falls vacant. The NPC Full Congress elects a new state vice president when that office falls vacant. Should misfortune make both the state president and vice president offices fall vacant, the NPC Full Congress shall elect both a new state president and a new vice president. During the vacancy the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee temporarily serves as acting state president.

 

 

3. Power and Function

 

The state president’s powers fall into two basic categories, domestic and foreign. The state president’s domestic powers are to promulgate laws passed by the NPC, appoint or remove the premier, vice premiers, state councilors and ministers, to confer state medals and titles of honor, to issue orders of special pardons, to proclaim martial law, to proclaim a state of war and to issue orders for mobilization. In foreign affairs, the state president receives foreign diplomatic representatives, appoints or recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad and ratifies or abrogates treaties and important agreements with foreign states. Chinese constitutional scholar Zhu Guobin divides the presidential power into six sub-powers: to promulgate laws enacted by NPC; to issue orders; to appoint or to dismiss; power in foreign affairs;power to declare war and power to honor.

 

Obviously these are substatial powers. However, according to the Constitution, the state president cannot exercise these powers on his or her own initiative. He or she has to exercise them in pursuance of decisions by the NPC. The Constitution requires the state president to operate passively. Moreover, the state president must carry out the NPC’s decisions. Under the people’s congressional government of China, the NPC is supreme among all state institutions. No constitutional branches, including the state president, can veto or revoke decisions made by NPC. One marked exception is the power to nominate the candidate for the premier. In doing so the state president has to nominate the candidate for the premier in pursuance of a decision made by the Communist Party, not the NPC. The only power that the state president may exercise on his or her own is to receive foreign diplomatic representatives on behalf of the People’s Republic of China.

The powers of the state president under the current Constitution differ from those under the 1954 Constitution most notably in that he or she no longer commands the armed forces as state president. That power belongs to the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

 

As understood and explained by China’s academic community, the state president simply promulgates or proclaims what the NPC has decided and passed. Some Chinese political scholars praise the state presidency for being above specific state affairs. Thereby it “is favorable to manifest and maintain prestige for the state president both at home and abroad.”

 

 

However, the practices of State President Jiang Zemin have added some new functions to the office. President Jiang plays a very active role on the political stage. He often holds talks with foreign heads of state that are more than nominal. Most conspicuous are Jiang’s talks with US President Clinton and President Bush. Their talks ranged widely over substantive political problems that normally fall under the prerogative of the head of government. According to the Constitution, activities of this kind are not subject to decision by the NPC and do not require NPC authorization. Many Chinese political and constitutional scholars have taken note of the new practices and some have argued for amending the Constitution to provide for a more active state president. I favor such a constitutional amendment.

 

The Constitutional requirement for a passive state president no longer suits changing political needs. At stake is the role of the general secretary of the Communist Party, now the number one leader of the Party. The general secretary necessarily plays an active role both in internal Party matters and in state life. However, under the political principle of separation of Party function from that of the state it is certainly inappropriate for the Party general secretary to be involved in state life directly if he or she holds no state position. What ought to be the appropriate state position for the general secretary? Historically, the top leaders of the Communist Party have assumed differing positions. Mao Zedong was the state president. Deng Xiaoping was Central Military Commission Chairman. Hua Guofeng was premier. Another possible post is chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. Indeed, at the local level the top Party leaders now tend to hold the post of chairman of the standing committee of the local people’s congress. But Jiang Zemin prefers state president for good reasons. State president is head of state and the most prestigious state official. On the other hand, the responsibilities of state president are rather limited and flexible compared to those of either the NPC Standing Committee chairman or State Council premier. These attributes of the state presidency make this office the best position for the General Secretary of the Party to play. Jiang’s choice then will most likely serve as a binding precedent. In other words, China’s state presidency is bound to differ from those state presidents or monarchs following the Westminster model in that it is held by the number one leader of the leading political party who will be active and more than honorary. China’s state president differs also from American president in that he or she is not head of the administration and cannot check the legislative branch. China’s state president also differs from French president because the former is subject to the control of the legislative institution, rather than over.

 

China’s Constitution needs to be amended to allow for an active state president. Because the general secretary of the Communist Party holds the state presidency, the passive state president required by the Constitution no longer fits with political reality. Certainly a constitutional amendment should make the active state president accountable to the NPC, thus maintaining the power-responsibility balance.

 

One Chinese constitutional scholar, Qin Xudong, has suggested a comprehensive amendment to the Constitution regarding the state presidency. Qin’s amendment would make substantial provisions for the state presidency. Among other things, it would stipulate that the president is China’s head of state. Candidacy to the presidency would be limited to native-born Chinese or Chinese citizens who have resided in China for more than ten years. The age range for candidates would be between 45 and 75 years. Compensation for the president could not be increased or decreased during the term of service. The president would not be allowed to hold any other position of profit or engage in profit-making activities during the term of service. Upon taking office the president must pledge to defend the Constitution and accept legal punishment for any violation of the pledge. In any situation threatening national independence, territorial integrity or the normal exercise of constitutional powers, the president should only adopt necessary measures after urgent consultation with the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and the State Council premier. The president should be removed from office upon conviction for treason, bribery or other high crimes or misdemeanors.

 

The state vice president has two kinds of work to do. First, he or she assists the president in his or her work. Second, he or she may exercise such functions and powers of the presidency as the president may delegate.

 

The office of state vice president has undergone some changes. In the past the post was assigned to a senior Party member or non-Communist. When taken by a senior Communist it functioned to assist the state president. When held by senior non-Communist it further embodied the principle of multiple parties sharing power. Jiang Zemin has chosen Hu Jintao, sixteen years Jiang’s junior and the youngest Standing committee member of the Political Bureau of the 15th Party Central Committee, to be the state vice president and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Apparently, Jiang made the office of state vice president available to Hu so that he may gain the know-how in state life that will prepare him to succeed Jiang.

 

4. Status

 

The relationship of creation and function between the state president and the NPC should be very simple. The state president is elected and can be removed from office by the NPC. He or she promulgates or proclaims what the NPC has decided and passed. However, the way that the notion “head of state” is held by some of China’s Party leaders still affects how many Chinese people perceive the state president. According to Mao Zedong and many of his senior followers, the NPC is the highest organ of state power. This very status of the NPC makes it impossible to define the state president as the head of state. As Li Weihan, one of the key drafters of the 1954 Constitution, has explained it, defining the state president as China’s head of state is incompatible with the people’s congressional government and will bore a loophole in it. Then what is the state president? Some Chinese hold that the state president shares with the NPC Standing Committee the status of being China’s head of state. This understanding is so powerful that the 1982 Constitution is silent on the status of the State President. A well-established Chinese constitutional scholar, Professor Wu Jialin, holds that the current Chinese Constitution follows the collective state head system but it also stipulates that the state president represents China before foreign states. Therefore China still has a collective state head with the state president as its representative.

 

When Jiang Zemin took the office of state president, the majority of China’s political and academic commentators and the media had given up the traditional view and accepted that the preeminence of the NPC can be compatible with designating the state president as China’s head of state. Professor Xu Chongde, a leading Chinese constitutional scholar, tells the public to be more flexible about the definition of state head. He champions the view that to be the state head one does not have to hold power. “So long as the Constitution confirms that the state head is simply the highest representative of the nation in the international community then that suffices. Thus we can say that the state president is the head of the People’s Republic of China.” Now, the majority of Chinese follow the conventional international understanding about the head of state, a sign of progress most favorable to the growth of China’s state presidency as an independent state institution.

 

C. The State Council

 

Historically the State Council of China has fared much better than either the NPC or the state president. Its power and authority survived even the turbulent years of the “cultural revolution”. Deng Xiaoping told the nation that the “Center” referred to both the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council. Supported by that belief and led by the most popular and authoritative Premier, Zhu Rongji, the State Council now is moving into its golden time.

 

1. Stability of the Institution

 

According to the Organization Act of the Central People’s Government, passed in 1949,the Central People’s Government Committee was the highest organ of state power. It set up several state institutions to exercise the executive, military, judicial and procuratorial functions. First among them was the Government Administration Council. It exercised the national executive function although its jurisdiction excluded national defense. The Government Administration Council was the forerunner to the later State Council. The 1954 Constitution established the State Council and its provisions on the nature, status, power and functions, creation and term were largely retained by the 1975,1978 and 1982 Constitutions. As Doctor Zhu Guobin argues, “Enactment of the 1954 Constitution marked the formal establishment of Chinese administrative system”.

Change of Numbers of Institutions of the State Council (1949-1998)*